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1. Introduction
We call  a  metaphysical  position panmentalistic  if  the  existence of  irreducible mental 
states  of  consciousness,  which  may  have  causal  effects  on  all  physical  systems,  is 
assumed.  Panmentalism is  distinguished from materialism by the  assumption of  non-
physical states, from epiphenomenalism by the assumption of their causal effects, from 
classical  dualism by the  assumption  of  mental  states  of  stokes  and stones  and from 
idealistic positions by the concession of the existence of the physical reality [1].
We prepare here a panmentalistic meal and serve it with arguments.  We are cooking this 
meal for our refreshment and try to make it palatable to the reader. Panmentalism appears 
tasty  compared  with  other  metaphysical  conceptions.  Contemporary  materialistic  and 
naturalistic positions are dominant in the discussion despite the fact that there are no 
good  reasons  to  accept  them,  this  is  the  poor  soup  of  the  new  century  [2]. 
epiphenomenalism does  not  meet  our  needs  for  freedom in the   choice   of  physical 
ingredients  and thus has the bad taste of forcible tube feed.  Subjective Idealism is  a 
lonely affair it could not serve the inter-subjective quality of the common physical meal. 
An  objective  idealism  with  respect  to  nature  ignores  the  wild  variety  of  natural 
ingredients we may use.  At least classical dualism is not well done by the restriction of 
the assignment of mentality to creature.
We serve our dish in six courses: 
We first sketch our conception of physical reality with a short glimpse on recent results 
related to determinism. Then we describe our conception of mental reality  and argue 
against supervenience of mental states on physical states. In the third course we remind 
the reader on effectiveness of his will and introduce a mental-physical low of free will. 
After that we explain the advantage of the assignment of mental states to stocks and 
stones by means of a mountain. In the next course we ask empirical questions for further 
scientific inquiry that may  support or  refute our metaphysical speculation. At the end 
we include a few comments on ethical consequences of panmentalism compared with 
other metaphysical conceptions.
2. Physical Reality
Physical objects have spatial-temporal properties, especially two physical objects of the 
same kind may not be at the same time at the same place. The distribution of  matter and 
energy has spatial-temporal properties and thus the interactions of physical objects have 
such properties as well. In this sense physical objects and their interactions are in the 
physical space-time.  
Obviously the physical  universe is  not  static,  we find different  states  of  the physical 
reality at different times. There is an evolution of the universe, the evolution of galaxies, 
solar  systems,  the  evolutions  of  biological  kinds  on  the  earth,  human  society  and 
economy are part of this general evolution. 
To  describe  the  evolution  of  the  universe  by  physical  laws  is  the  great  project  of 
scientific  inquiry.   Also science is  a  very recent  phenomenon in the  development of 
mankind  there  are  first  achievements  of  scientific  efforts.  At  this  the  metaphysical 
assumption  of  determinism  is  widely  propagated  in  the  scientific  community.  It  is 
supposed that the states and the dynamics of physical systems are determined by physical 
conditions, the physical universe is assumed to be  causally closed.  Many representatives 
of the scientific community are committed to naturalism: Nature became what it is by 
natural reasons. This ideology prearranges as “our” scientific world view the sentences of 
western societies.
Ironically  recent results  of  physical  research demonstrate that  at  least  determinism is 
false. The behaviour of  physical systems at small space scales is not at all determined. If 
we  know the  state  of  the  system by  measurement  only  a  probability  distribution  of 
possible states of the system in its near future is determined. If a system at macroscopic 
scales in reasonably complex the uncertainty at small scales leads  to uncertainty of the 
evolution at large space scales, if we consider long spaces of time. The amount of time in 
the evolution of a system that leads to stochastic prognosis depends on the complexity of 
the dynamics of the system. Complex physical systems have wide variety of states that 
may arise in a short time of their evolution. In highly complex physical systems like the 
body of a human being only a probability distribution of behaviour is determined after a 
while.  Especially  if  we  consider  coupled  oscillators  as  an  appropriate  model  of  the 
human  brain,  physicality  undistinguishable  input  may  produce  completely  different 
output of the brain. In relative simple mechanical models like those of the solar systems 
the states  are determined for  long times up to some error bounds.  Nevertheless after 
millions of years only a stochastic description is possible [3].  
The uncertainty of the evolution of the physical universe does not contradict the thesis 
that it is causal closed, it contradicts determinism. If one assumes objective randomness 
of physical  reality,  one may insist  on causal  closeness:  Nature became what it  is  by 
natural  chance.  Only if  we reject  randomness,  the assumption of  effects  in physical 
reality that are not physical, is necessary.  
We note  at  this  point  that  scientific  inquiry  is  free  of  judgement  on  the  problem of 
randomness, divine fate, or causal effects of mentality. In fact there remains a lot of work 
for philosophical reasoning.             
3. Mental Reality 
I have sensations, sentiments, emotions and thoughts. Topology is a priori not the form of 
existence of this objects, thus they are not in the physical space time. Therefore mental 
states are not part of physical reality. Mental states are a priori states of a consciousness, 
the consciousness of the mental  is  its  characteristic  property in the same way as the 
physical is spatial-temporal. The attempts to naturalize the mental reality are therefore to 
end up in smoke. Something that is continuous is not spatial, something that is not spatial 
is  not  physical.  No  model  of  the  body  of  a  human  being,  even  if  it  includes  an 
sophisticated description of the brain  and its dynamics, explains  how and why anything 
is conscious. A theory of spatial-temporal nature does not explain or just describe the 
quality of experience or the intention of thoughts [4]. It is just the consciousness of the 
mental that excludes it from reduction on physical processes.  At this we do not dispute 
the existence of correlations between mental states and the physical states. If I take a 
sleeping pill, my mental states will change and perhaps I will find some sleep. If I have a 
couple of drinks in a bar, this will have an influence on my emotions and perhaps on my 
sensations as well. As in case of physical correlations mental-physical correlations may 
be interpreted causally. Also we do not know what causality beside correlation means, 
we adopt here the phrase of cause and effect.  
All contemporary naturalist,  materialists epiphaenomenalists or whatever,  agree in the 
assumption of the supervenience of mental processes on physical processes: There are no 
mental changes  without physical changes that cause them. We are not convinced by this 
minimal materialism. We assume that the same brain process may cause different mental 
episodes under different perspectives of the consciousness. We have the experience of 
the  change of  perspective  of  consciousness.  Similar  states  of  our  body feel  different 
depending on the perspective of our consciousness.  We claim here that  the state and 
dynamics  of  this  perspective  is  not  caused  by  physical  states  or  processes.  This 
hypothesis is in principle open for an empirical justification. We will not find identical 
neuro-physiological processes of different persons, but maybe we find sufficient similar 
processes. Now we ask the persons what their mental episode was like.  We claim that 
the persons may tell us up very different mental episodes. Especially we assert that we 
will be told about changes in the mind of one person that does not appear in the mind of 
another  person.  We  would  interpret  such  a  result  as  change  in  the  perspective  of 
consciousness  that  is  not  caused  by  physical  changes.  If  we  were  right  with  our 
hypothesis, the  assumption of supervenience of the mental on the physical would have 
serious difficulties.  There is a special dualistic concept of the consciousness of mental 
states and processes beyond our hypothesis that we like to describe.
A consciousness in our sense is a monadic entity that does not exists in physical space-
time.  Consciousness  is  in  a  perspectivecal  relation  to  physical  systems,  like  human 
bodies. Physical processes are thus correlated with mental processes. We might say that 
for  instance  neuro-physiological  process  cause  sensations,  sentiments,  emotions  and 
thoughts.  The conscious  experience of  sensations,  sentiments,  emotions  and thoughts 
depends on both, the perspective of consciousness and the content of consciousness that 
is caused by physical reality.  If we assume this conception of consciousness, the thesis 
of emergence of consciousness in the biological evolution, in question, is unnecessary. 
There is no answer to the question why and how the physical universe in its evolution 
should  lay  consciousness  one  sunny  day  on  the  table  of  nature.  The  qualitative  gap 
between conscious and unconscious objects is an explanatory gap. Thus the assumption 
of emergences is not justified, if it is necessary for our world view. We think emergence 
is nothing but an arbitrary metaphysical construction to defend materialistic monism. We 
prefer to assume that our world contains consciousness as one of its basic structures. 
4. Free will
Beside the ability of thought, sensation and sentiment my consciousness has an additional 
property, it wants certain actions of my body.  The phenomenology of this intent is easy 
to describe: From the range of spatial-temporal evolutions of our body in its environment 
we choose one. Then we use will power and if this power is strong enough, our body 
does what our consciousness wants it to do. If we do not use will power, our brain in 
interaction  with  its  environment  will  dice  out  our  behaviour.  Physical  condition 
determine a probability distribution of possible actions. Which behaviour appears is not 
at all determined.  A brain without the intent of consciousness is nothing but a highly 
complex roulette table. 
If we use will power, the probability distribution of possible actions will change. Beside 
physical conditions, the mental condition of will does have an impact on the physical 
evolution of a system. We define a unit of will power as the mental power that is needed 
to make a behaviour that appears with probability ½ under physical conditions certainly 
determined. The will power that we need for a physically impossible action is infinte and 
the will power for a physically certain action is obviously zero. Therefore we introduce 
the mental-physical low of will as follows: 
W(P)=1/P-1
here P the probability that an action appears under physical conditions and W(P) is the 
will power that is needed  to make this action certain.  
The will power that individuals have is bounded and is subjected to temporal changes 
that may depend on mental episodes. Therefore not only physical impossible behaviour 
but also physical possible behaviour is not certain to obtain.  In some situations we need 
luck to do what we want to do. 
Beside physical forces the will power of consciousness is one basic condition for the 
evolution of the universe.  Beside chances will power may be used to explain why one of 
many possible evolutions of a system takes place in nature. The fact that will power is 
not considered by scientists is caused by metaphysical prejudices: Consciousness is not 
part of spatial-temporal nature and may hence not have effects on nature. Our sciences 
dances around the golden calf of causal closeness of nature. Interests of groups account 
for this. If we give up causal closeness of nature abilities like creativity, intuition and 
compassion, would designate the distribution of funds. Such abilities are not trained and 
rarely accepted in the scientific community.
At this point we like to recommend a metaphysical turn to all people that are in true love 
with  the  term  nature:  Nature  contains  spatial-temporal  processes  and  processes  in 
consciousness.  Both  processes  constitute  in  permanent  interaction  our  reality.  This 
attitude does not  limit the scope of natural science, in fact it extents it.      
5. Panmentalism
Consider a mountain. Mountains do have an evolution in time. In hundred thousand years 
one valley might have become deeper or it might have vanished by  aggradation. If we 
have all information about the mountain and its environment, future science will predict 
the probability of the alternatives. On the other hand it is not determined by physical 
conditions  what  alternative  takes  place.  The  spatial-temporal  system  “mountain”  is 
complex enough  to justify this conjecture. Of course we might assume that there exists 
chance in nature and the mountain became what it became by chance.  At this point we 
argue that a stochastic model does give any explanation why one of the physical possible 
states  get  real.   This  abandonment  of  explanation  is  respectable  in  consideration  of 
human ignorance. On the other hand it is not necessary if we have an explanation. 
What a mountain might be conscious of and what motivates its decisions remains of 
course creative speculation.  Human beings and mountains are quite different systems 
thus  the  content  of  consciousness  of  a  mountain and human being will  considerably 
differ. We do not want to assume that a mountain sees, hears, tastes or smells. Also we 
do not expect thoughts as the consequence of functional cognition. We assume that a 
mountain has a sensation of its rawness and a sensation of its weight. Assuming some 
sentiments in addition such sensations will motivates a mountain to certain decisions. If 
our mountain feels to raw or to weighty it will use its will power to cause such physical 
changes that counteract these situation. If its will power is big enough, corresponding 
physical changes of our mountain will really take place. In this manner we can explain 
physical  changes  that  appear  arbitrary  in  contemporary  science.  If  we  have  the  best 
possible  physical  predictions  of  the  evolution  of  mountains,  the  development  of  a 
behaviour theory and an individual psychology of mountains makes sense.  
After this example we finish with a philosophical argument for panmentalism. I only 
know that  I  am conscious.  The diversity  and unity  of  my experience takes  me by a 
conclusion on the best explanation to the assumption of physical reality. After we have 
left  the  solipsistic  perspective  we  find  nothing  in  physical  reality  that  explains  why 
anything is conscious.  Therefore classical dualism that assigns consciousness only to 
human beings or creatures gets inconsequent. In the same sense as the behaviour of other 
human beings indicates that they are conscious and hence have free will, behaviour of 
stocks and stones may explain what in the physical random game indeed happens. We 
interpret this as an evidence for mental states of mountains as we interpret the behaviour 
of other people as an evidence for their consciousness.  In consequence everything might 
be conscious. 
6. Empirical questions
Consider  a  roulette  table  once  again.  If  the  results  of   a  long  sequence  of  games 
significantly differ from the expectation values, the roulette table will be replaced by the 
owner of a gambling house. There may be physical explanations for this phenomenon, 
for instance the roulette table may be out of balance. If we now examine the roulette table 
as  good  as  physical  possible  and  do  not  find  a  physical  explanation,  things  get 
metaphysically interesting.  If the results of the sequence of games, were very improbable 
we might search for a non-physical explanation. There are in principle three different 
kinds of explanations of individual behaviour of a roulette table. Firstly we could insist 
on chance. On the long term even the improbable happens. Such a stochasticism is not 
open for refutations since it  means the abandonment of an explanation.  Secondly we 
could stipulate a miracle which means that “gods” have some effect on physical reality. 
Since we are not acquainted with “gods” this type of explanation seems to us not very 
attractive. Thirdly we could assume, in projection of our own will, that the roulette table 
in question wanted to behave in that way that it behaves. In further projection we might 
stipulated  a  mental  motivation  of  the  roulette.  For  instance  the  identical  distribution 
might  be  boring to some roulette  one day.   Then the roulette  uses its  will  power to 
produce metaphysically more interesting behaviour.
We do not claim here physically normal roulette tables with individual behaviours exists. 
We only claim that they possible exists, hence the existence of such roulette tables is a 
empirical questions. Data concerning this question are gratefully accepted.
Now we like  to  have  a  look  at  more  complex  roulette  tables  like  human  beings  or 
mountains. If we had a statistical analysis of most exponents of this classes of objects, 
that confirm stochastical distribution of behaviour determined by physical conditions, we 
would give up free will of men and mountain. We would accept stochastical determinism 
of nature and epiphenomenalism of mental states. But this is not the state of scientific 
research. For complex systems neither our scientific models nor our mathematical tools 
are sufficient to give honest forecasts. If we have such forecasts one day we conjecture 
that empirical data will hint on the existence of mental effects and free will.
7. Ethical consequences 
As we indicate in the introduction metaphysical questions are any time questions about 
taste. With strong assumptions and appropriate adaptations in our net of opinions any 
metaphysical position could consistently be defended. Arguments and empirical data are 
never strong enough to disprove any position. On the other hand not only the search for 
truth,  but  also  the  aspiration  of  goodness  is  a  philosophical  motivation.  Hence  a 
metaphysical position is not only evaluated by its epistemic justification, but also by its 
ethical consequences.
Materialism promotes the orientation of human civilisation on material values. Together 
with determinism this is the end of ethics.  If we continue to fight each other,  using 
egoism and competition, this would be our causal destination. If we continue to destroy 
the earth with the growth of our population and the growth of  our economy this would 
be our nature as a biological kind.  Stochastic determinism and epiphenomenalism is no 
way out of  this.  Hence we should not accept this  position if  we do not  have strong 
reasons  to  do  so.   Even classical  dualism promotes  the  hubris  of  mankind with  the 
hypothesis that our mentality is something very special in the universe. Such a position 
may cause the irreverent behaviour of mankind we see all  day. Of course this is not 
desirable.
In contrast panmentalism gives us back the idea of freedom and responsibility in the 
boundary of our will power in the physical universe. Principally Panmentalism equates us 
with all complex systems in the universe with respect to options of decision and does 
hence tear down all hubris. It allows compassion not only with animals but also with 
plants,  mountains,  houses,   oceans and even with the hole solar system. There is  no 
question that such a comprising compassion is ethically desirable.
Remarks
[1] In the literature we find the term “panpsychism” for this position. We do not use the 
term “psyche” since is original only assigned to living beings.  We do not have any 
philosophy historical or exegetical intentions here. We recommend the bibliography  for 
“panpsychism”  by    Chamers  und  Bourget,  see  http://consc.net/mindpapers/1.4g  to 
readers with such interests.
[2]  Our  materialisms  criticisms  appeared  in  “Marburger  Forum”  see 
http://www.philosophia-online.de/mafo/heft2007-4/neu_wid.htm 
[3]  The  literature  to  this  issue  is  enormous,  see  again  Chamers  und  Bourget 
http://consc.net/mindpapers/
[4] This interpretation is not common-sense in mathematics and physics. It is our opinion 
after ten years of research in stochastic analysis of complex dynamical systems. We will 
justify this opinion in detail elsewhere. A reader who is not convinced may read the rest 
of the paper under the condition: What follows if he is right here? 
 

